Abstract

This research concerns the process of nation-building in developing states with a focus on Pakistan. The study explores hurdles in the process of nation-building in Pakistan. In this connection, the study takes into account key political disparities such as uneven representation of  various ethnic groups and regions in legislature and provincial assemblies, state-led cosmetic political reforms and feudalism and biradri-based political system that exist in various administrative units (and their tiers) of the state. The study also highlights the major administrative flaws and demographic shifts and divisions that are hampering the process of nation-building in Pakistan. The research also details the economic disparities found in various forms and at various levels in the state which minimize the prospects of nation-building in Pakistan. The study concludes that nation-building is always a state-controlled process and Pakistan has hardly addressed various hindrances in nation-building process such as political, demographic, administrative and economic issues of the various administrative units (and their tiers) as a state. 

Key Words

Nation-building, State-building, Demographic, Pakistan, Administrative Flaws

Introduction

Deutsch (1966) explains nation-building as a process of building or structuring a national identity by a state. According to him, nation-building aims to keep a state politically stable. Emerson (1967) describes that nation-building involves loyalty of citizens towards their country more than their ethnic groups. Simply, it can be said that the goal of nation building is to form a nation by eradicating differences and integrating all diverse groups, setting common ground and values. Some scholars are of the view that nation-building and state-building are closely interlinked yet independent of each other. In this connection, Tarling (2004) holds the opinion that a nation can be built without building a state while a state can also be built without building a nation but that can be done just on theoretical and conceptual levels. This has been attempted in the past but it is not possible practically in the contemporary world. Colonial states established by the Imperial powers faced nationalist movements and as a consequence, the state-building process, devoid of nation-building spirit failed to achieve goals in those states (p.11). Contrary to this currently, there are more than 60 communities considering themselves as nations although they do not have achieved status of a nation-state (Unrepresented nations, 2016).

It is largely agreed that the “nation-building is a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other” (Alesena, & Reich, 2009). The goal of nation-building is to unify the people living within a certain state in such a way that the state is politically stable, economically viable and socially sustainable. According to Talentino (2004), nation-building combines two objectives; identity building, which surrounds creating a communal identity and state-building which refers to the extension and development of administrative functions. One of the ways to achieve communal identity is social, economic and political development (p.559). 

Nation-building has been thoroughly discussed in academic and semi-academic circles more specifically in context to African and Asian states. Alafuro Epille (2011) counts corruption, quagmire of violence and inequality as major challenges to nation-building in Nigerian Delta. Gambari (2008) believed constitutional and leadership challenges and the problems got in legacy during colonial rule as the biggest hurdles in nation-building in Nigeria. Groves (2008) argues that nation-building in Africa has failed because rather accepting the differences among the African communities in one state, nation-building efforts have largely aimed at suppressing such differences. English (1976) and Khan (2009) have highlighted military rules, corruption, and problem of identity as issues hampering the process of nation-building in Bangladesh. Some scholarly and semi-scholarly work can also be traced on challenges in process of nation-building in Pakistan. Hippler (1998) points out ethnicity, provincial autonomy and powerful bureaucracy as the biggest hurdles in nation-building process in Pakistan. Islam (2015) has addressed the challenges of nation-building in context to Pakistan and Bangladesh and has pointed out identity integration, elite-mass integration, economic integration and political integration as the biggest challenges in nation-building in Pakistan. This paper also discusses challenges of nation-building in Pakistan but contrary to the previous studies where just problems at the state level are addressed, this paper takes into account challenges existed at the grassroots level in all administrative units of Pakistan and their tiers in a broader spectrum. 

This paper explores the reasons commonality of interests, goals and preferences leading to communal identity and state-building were not achieved in Pakistan despite carving out a state on a unified formative ideology. First section has given methodology and review of literature of the addresses subject. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two of the paper depicts a brief history of nation-building in Pakistan. Section three of the paper highlights few of the factors at the grassroots level in some administrative units (and their tiers) hampering the nation-building process in Pakistan.  Last section concludes the study.

History of Nation-Building in Pakistan

The process of nation-building in Pakistan could not have been initiated at the state level in the early years of the state’s inception due to legislative and executive measures of the federal government which deprived the provinces of their source revenue such as income tax, sales tax and custom duties that they had been enjoying under the government Act of India 1935. Furthermore, the process met some more complexities when the Western-learned ruling elites co-opted Urdu language for the process of nation-building in Pakistan.  Some more issues such as the framing of constitution in respect of regional or population basis, representation in the federal government and one unit issue which turned majority province into minority and discarded territorial identities of other provinces aggravated the problems of nation-building in Pakistan (Islam, 2015) and also led to dismemberment of the state in 1971.  

The earlier generation of Pakistan’s leadership was westernized and secular modernizers of their new society and frequently used implicit as well as explicit Western “Modernization theories.” It began under the leadership of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, but accomplished under Ayub Khan’s Presidency. Later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Socialist Rhetoric, Islamist Modernization of Zia-ul-Haq and Secular Modernization of Pervez Musharraf were marked as several other approaches to nation-building but none of them proved to be decisive in achieving their conceived goals of either state or nation-building in Pakistan (for more details see, Qadir, 2006; Rehman, 2006). General Pervez Musharraf tried to initiate nation-building process on boosting economy but the distributive aspects of the economic boom proved to be damaging for nation-building process in Pakistan. Below are some of the contemporary issues of nation-building in Pakistan:

Contemporary Issues of Nation-Building in Pakistan

Currently Pakistan is overwhelmed with multifaceted problems such as violence, militancy and terrorism which are destabilizing the state and hence are complicating the nation-building process in Pakistan. Some of the root causes of contemporary issues of Pakistan creating major obstacles in nation-building process include 

a. Political disparities,

b. Administrative flaws 

c. Demographic shifts and divisions

d. Economic disparities and unequal distribution of resources 

a. Political Disparities

Uneven representation of various regions and ethnic groups in legislature and provincial assemblies, state-led cosmetic political reforms and feudalism and biradri system in politics are marked as the notable factors for widening political disparities in administrative units (and their tiers) of Pakistan and are also hindering nation-building process.  

It is widely perceived that uneven representation of ethnic groups and regions in legislature and provincial assemblies has led to imbalance distribution and utilization of resources in Pakistan. For instance, seventeen Baloch parliamentarians represent their province in the lower house, the National Assembly, comprising of 342 members while for Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  and FATA their number are 183, 75, 43 and 12 respectively. The upper house, the Senate, where Balochistan has equal representation to other provinces does not have much power. The Baloch people feel that they are not well represented in a house of parliament which is more powerful under Constitution of the State. The uneven representation at the national as well as provincial levels can be traced in some other tiers of the administrative units of the state. For instance, Mohajirs constitute 48% while Pashtuns account for 22 % of Sindh’s largest city Karachi. The Mohajirs’ representative Muttahida Qoumi Movement (MQM) holds 37 and 24 seats in Sindh and National Assembly respectively while the Awami National Party (ANP) which is Pashtuns’ representative party holds no representation in Sindh and National Assembly’s allocation for Karachi respectively. The unequal representation has led to “unequal government spending on development and service delivery” (Yusaf, 2010) as MQM without taking into consideration the interests of Pashtuns consumes more resources for the welfare of Mohajirs in the urban areas of Sindh. This uneven representation leads to divergence of interests and prevents attaining commonality of interests, goals and preferences acquired to unify people, which is an ultimate goal of nation-building process. 

The feudal system and biradari politics is also promoting political disparities across several regions of the state. The feudal system and biradari politics of northern, central and southern Punjab and rural Sindh was initiated by the political parties as they were perceived to be divided on the basis of biradaris and local groups rather than ideology. Moreover, the biradaris also have affiliations with the political parties on the basis of their mutual clashes rather than ideologies (Ahmed, 2009). It is an undeniable fact that biradriasm is a main part of our culture. Therefore, biradari politics is one of the dominant factors of politics in Pakistan and political parties are “hijacked by biradaris and process of interest aggregation is limited” (Ahmed, & Naseem, 2011). The waderas and feudals besides being influential over economic affairs of the poor also control thanas and official machinery of the province. This creates hurdles in the “democratic process in the province as the freedom of vote is suppressed.” The feudals’ concept is, “keep the people backward and uneducated, economically dependent, rule them through thanas and official machinery and consolidate your power over the area” (Qazi, 2004). In these conditions, when people are suppressed and kept politically, socially and economically disempowered by the feudal and wederas, the prospects of unification of people living in a state cannot be accomplished successfully. Hence, the state fails to be politically stable, economically viable and socially sustainable, which are ultimate ends of nation-building process. 

Often, the political reforms introduced by several governments in Pakistan aimed eradication of political disparities among the administrative units but they had also fallen short of achieving the conceived outcomes.  The reforms introduced in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) did not contribute in the process of nation-building in Pakistan. For instance, GB Empowerment and Self-Government Order 2009 was launched by the PPP government and was implemented through Presidential Order. According to the reforms, the Chief Executive was then the Chief Minister and there was also a provision added that governor would be appointed by the Federal government. The GB Council having power of upper house was also restructured as it was decided that six out of 15 members of the Council would be elected from the GB Legislative Assembly while the rest were to be elected from Pakistani Assemblies. According to the new adjustments, Prime Minister was the Chairman of the Council while the Minister for Kashmir Affairs was the Deputy Chairman. The people of GB have great reservations over these reforms as they believe that the reforms have tilted the balance of power towards the Centre which has more representation and power than the GB Legislative Assembly. The locals have reservations that GB is not owned by the state as they have not been given citizenship of Pakistan. They claimed that all reform packages were prepared after taking the consent of Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas who were never in favour of empowering GB populace. So, for them nothing changed rather a perception created that when it suits Pakistan, GB is considered a formal part of the country and when it suits to show GB as a disputed territory it is shown as that by Pakistan. The confusion further deepens when peaks such as K-2 or heroes like Lalik Jan (Nissan-e-Haider) are considered as Pakistani though they are from GB (Ali, Naqash, & Nagri, 2015). The GB had been ruled by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs for a long time and the new settlements of affairs through reforms with “ambiguities and anomalies in roles and responsibilities” have led to emergence of more problems (Hussain, 2009). 

Similarly, the people of Southern Punjab have grievances that many of the governments’ functionaries have failed to execute state-led reform plans effectively. According to them, when Local Government Ordinance was designed in 2001, it was the responsibility of the provincial government to “develop and train a district cadre of qualified and dedicated civil servant with long term commitments to serve the area” (Mehboob, 2011, 3). The constitutional protection period expired in 2009 and the idea of a district cadre did not turn into reality (Mehboob, 2011). 

Although, there can be seen some political developments under the State patronage in FATA such as the right to universal suffrage was given to the tribesmen of FATA in 1997’s general elections and Political Parties Act 2002 was extended to FATA which gave mandate to the political parties to launch campaign and initiate political activities freely like in the rest of the country. But, despite political developments none of the “acts of parliament are extendable or enforceable in FATA.” The parliamentarians elected on party basis cannot legislate for their constituencies (Sajjad, 2013). The reforms are really cosmetic as practically the state has done nothing to change the prevailing executive system of the agencies. Briefly, the political measures taken by the state to reduce political disparities further derailed the process of nation-building in Pakistan. Not to ignore that one of the objectives of nation-building as mentioned above is state-building which refers to the extension and development of administrative functions. When reforms are initiated for specific areas, it is the foremost responsibility of the state to make the efficient execution of administrative decisions. In all the above mentioned cases, the state failed to ensure the accomplishment of administrative affairs required enough for smooth sailing of state-building process after reforms initiatives and therefore, the nation-building process also derailed. 

b. Administrative Flaws

The administrative flaws in various administrative units (and their tiers) add more complications to the process of nation-building in Pakistan.

For instance, FATA has been quite weak as the Political Agent who is federal civil servant manages local administration by performing several functions such as executive, revenue collector and judge. Justice System under Frontier Crimes Regulations prevailed in FATA is less satisfied and is causing national disintegration. The article 247 (7) of the Constitution of Pakistan states that jurisdiction of provincial High Court and Supreme Court does not extend to FATA (Shinwari, 2010). Moreover, the tribes are operated through Maliks, some of whom are appointed by the tribes themselves while other official Maliks are selected by the Political Agents of each agency (Nawaz, 2009). The major role of Maliks is to maintain status quo introduced during the colonial era in the tribal areas and they are loyal to the Political Agents as they receive allowances from them.  The Khasadars as local police and Lashkars are raised by the Political Agents through Maliks to protect the interests of community by defending them and apprehending criminals (Shinwari, 2010). This poor governance system, where justice hardly prevails, has created distrust among people against the system. This situation has led the state to political, economic and social instability as it has been exploited by the Taliban-tagged law and Islamists militants (Shinwari, 2010) whose violent activities extend well beyond FATA to the entire state. 

Similarly, the major characteristics of governance in Balochistan are “tribal ethos and ethnic factionalism.” Balochistan’s administrative system is “hybrid of formal and informal systems.” Only 5% of the territory is controlled by the formal policing while 95% is under governance of levies recruited from the local tribes through “a mix of tribal norms and quasi-official procedures.” Moreover, the tribal elites controlling the justice system based on formal rules having no productivity for the common people create not only an insecure environment where conflicts prevail frequently but also it widens the communication gap between the state and the local communities (Pakistan’s Balochistan, 2013). In this uncertain condition, state and communities cannot set preferences and goals which are pre-requisites for attainment of objectives of nation-building process. 

The administrative flaws of same nature as pointed out regarding Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan also exist in various parts of KP. The social structure in KP comprising of “traditionally and community owned institutions and processes” have played a vital role in the everyday life of the tribes and local communities. On several occasions, these institutions have adopted the role of governance institutions or entities especially in the areas of “decision making and dispute resolution.” Among those traditional institutions, the dominant are Maliks, Hujrahs and Pashtun Wali. In addition to justice, these institutions may also provide platforms for solution of social or political issues having local relevance. Jirga holds a vital position in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) which is sanctioned by “the formal justice sector and legislative frame work provisions of FCR 1901” (Mehboob, 2011, 6). This system of justice and governance resembles FATA’s governance and justice systems and hence, leads to same flaws and issues.

c. Demographic Division and Shifts

Ethnic problems emerging out of demographic changes such as migration, assimilation etc. in all administrative units (and their tiers) are also posing challenge to the nation-building process in Pakistan. Eriksen (2013) holds the opinion that when migrants come into close contact with people of distinct traditions, cultures and identities, both locals and migrants strive for hold in the state’s power structure. This competition for resources minimizes feelings of unification for common interests and goals among citizens leading the state towards disintegration rather than building a nation. Several demographic divisions and shifts and fears associated are also dominantly shackling prospects of nation-building in Pakistan. For instance, the people of Balochistan have a great objection over the migration of people from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan as these have imposed a huge burden on the limited resources and economy of the province.  There is also a growing fear among the Blochis that making of Cantonments and developments at the Gwadar Port will attract the people of other provinces to shift in Baluchistan which will change the demographic balance of province (Latif, Hamza, 2009). Keeping this in view, the separatist militant groups in Balochistan are targeting and killing settler, educationists, doctors, professional and such like. The issue of same sorts are found in other tiers of the administrative units of Pakistan as well. 

Gayers (2003) described Karachi as an urban mess (pp.4-5). The city has been facing extreme planning and development problems due to mass migration. Karachi is a hub of industrial activities and for that reason migration towards the city never stops. The city has faced four waves of migration since inception of the state. From 1940 to 1950, Mohajirs migrated and settled in the city from India, from 1960 to 1980, Pashtuns shifted towards urban areas, 1970 to 1990’s, rural Sindhis drifted towards urban areas including Karachi and 1980 to 1999’s, Iranian and Afghanis moved to Karachi in a good number. Currently, it can be seen that although the major factor of conflict in Karachi is competition between Pashtuns and Mohajirs but the earlier influx of Iranians and Afghanis has also brought sectarian tussle and culture of armament in the city respectively (Javaid, Hashmi, 2012). The 1981’s figures tell that 4.6 million Muhajirs adjusted in Sindh and out of which 3.3 were in Karachi. A large number of Pathans, Balochs and Punjabis fascinated by the economic opportunities had been adjusted in the urban areas of the province. In the midst of these situations, Sindhis feel themselves turned to be as minority in their own lands as since 1965 and by 1981, 1.1 million Balochs, 2 million Punjabis and 0.7 million Pathans came to Sindh and majority of them settled in Karachi and Hyderabad. In these conditions Sindhis constituted the 5th largest ethnic group in the capital of the province, Karachi. In Hyderabad too, they are the second largest ethnic group after Muhajirs (Kennedy, 1991). Moreover, these divisions and shifts have led to ethno-political conflicts in the urban Sindh. Earlier, there was no delineation between political and ethnic parties from 1947 to 1970’s. Two important incidents laid foundations of ethno-political conflicts in urban Sindh. Firstly, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s policies were rightly addressing native Sindhis’ grievances and were providing hope to “lower their feelings of alienation from government.” In order to contend the Sindhi people, the government of PPP introduced quota system under which 60% jobs at the state level and admission in the government institutions were allocated to the rural population while it was decided to give 40% to the urban population. Secondly, in July 1972, the Sindh Legislative Assembly passed the Language Bill to protect Sindhi language. These policies were perceived and propagated as anti-Mohajir conspiracy and these led to the “rise of militant ethnicity” (Javaid, Hashmi, 2012) in the urban Sindh.

Deep Ethnic division in other parts of the state including Balochistan is also a major hurdle in attaining the goals of nation-building in Pakistan. For instance, out of 30 districts of Balochistan 21 are dominated by Baloch ethnics while the rest are dominated by other ethnic groups dominantly Pashtuns. The capital of the province Quetta is also ethnically and linguistically divided city. The total population of the city is between 1.1 and 1.3 million people and out of these 250,000 to 350,000 are Shia Hazara, 450,000-550,000 are Brahui and Baloch and 500,000-600,000 are Pashto speaking (The Shia Hazara, 2012). 

d. Economic Disparities and Unfair Allocation of Resources

In a heterogeneous society, ethnic identities get more depth due to economic disparities. The minority groups feel themselves threatened by the dominant groups in term of culture and ethnicity. The feelings of alienation and deprivation get more intensification in the absence of socio-economic justice (Shahzad, 2011). Economic disparities and fear of being discriminated in economic matters is creating hindrances in achieving a unified national identity in Pakistan. The Balochis have a strong resentment that mega development projects such as Gwadar Port, the Saindak Copper Project, the Coastal Highway linking Karachi with Gwadar and beyond and  the Mirani Dam  initiated for the economic development of the province will divert  the flow of benefits to the non-Balochi outsiders (Shahzad, 2011).  They have feelings that the exploitation of natural resources without little benefit for the locals serves the interests of the ruling elites and state’s institutions same as the resources of the Sub-continent were exploited to serve the interests of the Britain during the Colonial Period. 

It can be observed that the demographic shift and ethnic division have also led to economic disparity in the urban Sindh. The unemployment rate at the national level was 14.4 in 2009 while in Karachi it was 17.56%. There are two major reasons for the unemployment in Sindh’s urban areas: Firstly, the migration of low skill labours from the other areas of Pakistan has added more urban joblessness in the city. Secondly, in order to avoid tensions relevant to ethnic issues, the workers of same ethnic backgrounds are hired at different workplaces and as a result, Urdu speaking and Punjabis are preferred over the Pashtuns which has contributed to unemployment likely referred as “targeted unemployment.” There exists a wide gap between Karachi’s “most affluent residents and its low income or daily wages earners.” Urdu speaking Mohajirs and Punjabis are more affluent while Balochs and Pashtuns are among the poorest in the city which has nurtured ethnic hatred among the suppressed ethnic groups (Yusaf, 2010). Moreover, the forceful acquisition of irregular land by the political parties such as PPP, MQM and ANP observed in Karachi intensely after 2008 has inculcated resource competition approach among ethnic groups and parties. In fact, lack of any effective legal land allocation process and absence of any organized city administration have provided opportunities to the political parties to fill the “administrative vacuum” and regularize the lands as per requirement to attract new supporters (Yusaf, 2010). 

Moreover, it is widely speculated that the “pervasive institutional racism against Sindhis” has brought water issue in the area.  The inequitable distribution of water and construction of canals and dams along the upper riparian of river Indus have impeded the access of the people of province to water. There is a growing resentment among the rural Sindhis that scarcity of water will lead them to drought which in other words means economic catastrophe. Furthermore, there is found an extreme grievance in the rural population of Sindh that their cultivable lands are allotted to Punjabi military and civil bureaucrats.  Of these, Ghulam Mohammad Barrage cultivates 1.48 million acres of land and out of these 0.87 acres have been allocated to defense personnel and civil bureaucrats while out of 0.28 million acres of Sukkar Barrage land, 0.13 have been given to the army personnel (Ethnic Conflicts, 2011). Allocation of resources seems to be unfair in case of southern Punjab as well. The powerful civil bureaucrats having deep roots in central Punjab’s politics have allotted hundreds of thousands acres of state land to their kin, close friends and to those who have bribed them. This pattern is frequently practiced in Tal (Layyah) and Cholistan (Rais, 2009). The unfair distribute on of resources promoting the feelings of political alienation suppresses the process of nation-building in Pakistan.

The economic disparities can be observed in other administrative units of the state as well. For instance, economically FATA is the most backward region of Pakistan where majority of population lives in the rural areas. The WHO Reports 2001 shows that almost 50% of the tribesmen live below poverty line in FATA. 75% of the tribesmen have no access to clean water, the population growth rate is 3.9 % against the national growth rate of 1.9%, the literacy rate is 17% as compared to the national average of 56% and the unemployment rate is estimated to be 60 to 80% or even close to 100% seasonally if remittances and migrant labour are not counted. The poor economic condition of FATA has contributed a lot in badly affecting livelihood, social sector, employment and infrastructure outcomes (Wazir, 2011). After the US intervention in Afghanistan, Taliban, foreign militants and others who evacuated Afghanistan took refuge in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and developed good relations with the locals. Since Al-Qaeda’s arrival in the FATA, tribal entrepreneurs and even unemployed have found “harbouring foreign militants” as an attractive business to earn money. In these conditions, their compounds on high rent for training camps and shelter to militants and inflated prices of food items in the area have become the leading source of earning for the locals. The criminals have also joined the foreign terrorists’ in order to be benefitted from the Arab money (Nawaz, 2009) which had damaged the prospects of nation-building in Pakistan.

The socio-economic indicators of Gilgit-Baltistan show the backwardness of the area which can be judged by the per capita income of the province which is US $ 350 while the national figure stands at US $ 1046 and the literacy rate of the province is 38% while at the national level it is 56% (Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, 2010). Similarly, underdevelopment of southern Punjab can be well traced by comparing poor infrastructure (bridges, roads etc.), communication networks, weak social services institutions (health services, primary and secondary education etc.), scarcity of agricultural inputs and spaces in municipal services with other parts of the province. 43% of the southern Punjab’s population lives below the poverty line as compared to overall Punjab’s 27% population living below the poverty line. In some districts of Bhakkar, Layyah, Rajanpur and Lodhran, half of the population meets the poverty line (Khalid, Leghari, 2014). Some districts of southern Punjab are least developed such as Rajanpur, Muzaffarabad, D G Khan, Layyah, Lodhran, Bhakkar, Pak Patan, Rahim Yar Khan and Bahawalpur. The development indicators show that rural areas of Pak Patan, Rajanpur and D.G. Khan rank highest in unemployment while the urban employment opportunities show Rajanpur, Mianwali and Layyah experience the highest unemployment (Bengali, 2012). One must not ignore that the highly educated middle class has been expanded in Southern Punjab due to establishment of Jamia Islamia Bahawalpur as a full fledge university and Bahaudin Zakariya University, Multan. The liberal arts graduates of southern Punjab, who are unemployed are tempted to the radical religious groups become an easy prey to anti-state actors. So, the economic disparities existed in various parts of the state as mentioned above in FATA, southern Punjab, rural Sindh, Balochistan and in various parts of KP have not only ignited feelings of deprivation among people but also have brought militancy and violence in the state in the form of sectarianism and terrorism. The strong hubs of terrorists in FATA, and some other parts of Balochistan, KP and southern Punjab have challenged the writ of the state. The activities of terrorists stretching beyond the hubs to the entire state have not only contributed in leading the state to political and economic instability but also have posed a big threat even to the very existence of the state. In these conditions it is quite difficult to achieve a uniform national identity for smooth sailing of nation- building process in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The study concludes that political and economic disparities, administrative flaws and unchecked demographic shifts and divisions at the grassroots level in administrative units (and their tiers) have prevented the attainment of the goals of nation-building in Pakistan.  The democratic as well as military regimes promoted biradri-politics and feudal system to gain and sustain power. Regional parties were given share in power and unrepresented ethnic groups and regions were ignored in all regimes. Moreover, flawed administrative and judicial system in FATA and in some parts of KP and Balochistan was also used for political interests of the state authorities.   The study claims that no serious efforts have been observed at the state level to regulate demographic shifts and to overcome administrative flaws and economic disparities. As a result, unrest and political alienation have increased many times among masses in various administrative units (and their tiers) of Pakistan. Although the state authorities claimed some reforms to minimize political disparities among the administrative units of Pakistan but these were cosmetic and iconic as they failed to bring any substantial differences productive enough for smooth sailing of nation-building process in Pakistan. The study concludes that the nation-building process is always state led but the state policies have fallen short to address even obstacles required to be removed for the nation-building process in Pakistan. 

References

• Ahmed, M. (2009). Relationship between Political Parties and Non-political Powers: An Analysis with Reference to Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 29(1), 107-115.
• Ahmed, M. & Naseem, F. (January 2011). Social System Influence Political System: A Comparative Study of Sub-Continent. Berkely Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1). Retrieved from:
  https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/259368599_Social_System_Influences_Political_System_A_ Comparative_Study_of_the_Sub-Continent.
• Alesina, A. & Reich, B. (2015), Nation Building. Retrieved from:
  http://scholar.harvard.edu/ files/alesina/files/nation_ building_feb_2015 _0.pdf.
• Almost Pakistan: Gilgit-Baltistan in a Constitutional Limbo, (August 09, 2015). The Dawn.
• Bengali, K. (May 25, 2012). The Case for a New Province. The Dawn.
• Deutsch, K.VK. (1966). Nation-Building and National Development, In: KarlVKDeutschand Folt, W. J. Nation Building in Comparative Contexts, New York: Atherton, 88.
• Development Funds for South Punjab. (Nov 2010). Pildat Discussion Paper, Retrieved from:
• Emerson, R. (1967). From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African People, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
• English, J. C. (Winter 1976). Problems of Nation-Building in the New States: The Example of Bangladesh. Social Science, 51(1), 17-25.
• Epille, A. (2011). Challenges to Nation-Building: Corruption, Inequality and the Quagmire of Violence in the Niger Delta. Sacha Journal of Policy and Strategic Studies, 1(2), 55-63.
• Eriksen, T. H. (2013). Immigration and National Identity in Norway. Washington D.C: Migration Policy Institute.
• Ethnic Conflicts in Sindh, (October 2011). Retrieved from:
  http://www.pildat.org.
• Gayer, L. (2003). A Divided City: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan. Retrieved from
  http://www.cerisciencespo.com/archive /mai03 /artlg/.pdf.
• Gambari, I. A. (February 7, 2008). The Challenges of Nation Building: The Case of Nigeria, Presentation by the Under Secretary General and Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary General first Year Anniversary Lecture Mustapha Akanbi Foundation Sheraton Hotel Abuja, Nigeria.
• Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Regional Profile, Political Empowerment and Core Issues. (2010). Retrieved from:
  http://siteresources.worldbank.org
• Groves, A. (2008). Achievements and Limitations of Nation-building in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe, International Relations Paper, Oxford University. Retrieved from:
  http://www.e-ir.info.
• Hippler, J. (1998). Problems of Culture, Democracy and Nation-Building in Pakistan. Silk Road Journal, 1(4), 6-15.
• Hussain, A. (December 2009). The Gilgit Baltistan Reforms 2009, . Retrieved from:
  http://gbpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/GilgitBaltistan Reforms AHussain FinalDec09.pdf.
• Islam, N. (2015). Challenges of Nation-building in Pakistan and Bangladesh: Quest for Crisis Management. The Journal of Political Science, 53-76 . Retrieved from:
  http://ps.gcu.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Dr.- M.-Nazrul-Islam.pdf.
• Issues Facing Sindh. World Sindh Congress, (December 2003), . Retrieved from:
• Javaid, U. & Hashmi, R. S. (Summer, 2012). Contending Ethnic Identities: An Issue to Pakistan's Internal Security (The Case of Karachi). Journal of Political Studies, 19(1), 57-77.
• Kennedy, C. H. (1991). The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh. Asian Survey, 31(10), 938-955.
• Khan, M.D. (2009). Nation Building Problems in Bangladesh: A Socio-EconomicPolitical Perspective, Dhaka: The University Press Limited.
• Latif, M. I. & Hamza, M. A., (2009). Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Balcoh Nationalism during Musharraf regime. Pakistan Vision, 10(1), 58.
• Mehboob, S. R. (2011). Governance and Militancy in Pakistan's Southern Punjab Region, Center for Strategic and International Studies, . Retrieved from:
  https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/120312_Mehboob_SouthernPunjab_ Web.pdf.
• Nawaz, S. (2009). FATA--a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Washington D.C.: CSIS Press.
• NIPS, (2005). Assessment of Socio Economic Trends in GB. Annual Plan 2009- 10 (Planning Commission) & GB Govt, . Retrieved from: PakistanÂ’s Balochistan province under Siege. Center for Research and Security Studies. (May 6, 2013),
  http://crss.pk/?p=4078.
• NIPS, (2005). Assessment of Socio Economic Trends in GB. Annual Plan 2009- 10 (Planning Commission) Percent GB Govt, . Retrieved from: Pakistan's Balochistan province under Siege. Center for Research and Security Studies. (May 6, 2013),
  http://crss.pk/?p=4078.
• Qadeer, M. (2006). Pakistan - Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation, New York: Routledge.
• Qazi, N. (2004). Feudalism keeps Sindh backward. [Online] Article published in. Dawn on. 07th. June. Retrieved from:
  http://archives.dawn.com/2004/06/07/ebr13.htm
• Rais, R. B. (June 16, 2009). Analysis Southern Punjab. Daily Times.
• Rehman, A. (2006). Dynamism of Pakistan's Civil Society: Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources. Journal of International Development and Cooperation, 12(2), 59.
• Sajjad, U. (2013), Political Development in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas: A Step to Minimizing Extremism and Radicalization, . Retrieved from:
  http://frc.com.pk/new/tigah-journal-of-peace-and-development-volumeiii-july-2013-2.
• Shahzad, A. (2011). The Issue of Ethnicity in Pakistan: Historical Background. Pak Vision. 12(2), 11.
• Shinwari, A. N. (2010). Understanding FATA: Attitudes towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's FATA, vol. IV, . Retrieved from:
• Talentino, A. K. (2004). The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17(3), 559.
• Tarling, N. (2004). Nationalism in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 11.
• The Shia Hazara of Pakistan: A Community under Siege. (2012). . Retrieved from:
• Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations, UNPO Brochure. (2016). . Retrieved from:
  http://unpo.org/section/2.
• Wazir, M. M.K. (Winter 2011). Geopolitics of FATA after 9/11. Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) Journal. 11(1), 59-76.